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Highlights 
 The effect of the alternation bias on decisions over repeated lotteries is studied 
 A new explanation for Samuelson’s “fallacy of large numbers” is provided 
 The alternation bias effect interacts with intrinsic risk preferences 
 If subjects are risk averse, we find an increase in willingness to risk 
 If subjects are risk prone, we find a decrease in willingness to risk 
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Abstract 
The alternation bias is the tendency of people to believe that random events alternate 
more often than statistical laws imply. This paper examines the theoretical effect of this 
psychological bias on preferences over repeated investments by using a model of the 
belief in the law of small numbers. An alternation bias agent (ABA) has a different 
perception to a rational agent (RA) about the outcome distribution of the sum of n 
realizations of a lottery. The results show that an ABA, that maximises expected utility, 
could reject a single realization of a lottery while accepting several repetitions in 
accordance with Paul Samuelson’s fallacy of large numbers. Furthermore, the 
explanation of this type of preference, based on the alternation bias, is compatible with 
previous behavioural accounts. A more general result shows that the alternation bias 
increases (decreases) the expected utility of the perceived sum of identically distributed 
lotteries if individuals are risk averse (risk seekers). 
 
Keywords: alternation bias; repeated lotteries, expected utility, risk aversion, 
behavioural economics. 
JEL: D03, D81, G02, G11. 
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1. Introduction 
The alternation bias is the tendency of people to believe that random events alternate 
more often than statistical laws imply. This psychological bias is also called the 
"gambler's fallacy" and is a manifestation of the "belief in the law of small numbers" or 
"local representativeness" (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1971). There is wide empirical evidence of the alternation bias in experiments where 
subjects produce or judge random sequences (Zhao et al., 2014; Gilovich et al., 1985; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; see Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991, and Oskarsson et 
al., 2009, for a survey). 
An interesting research question is to what extent this psychological bias has an impact 
on economic behaviour and decision making. Rabin (2002) pointed out that an 
immediate consequence of the alternation bias in lottery play is people having 
incentives to bet on numbers that have not recently won. Rabin also finds that people 
believing in the law of small numbers make wrong inferences about the underlying 
probability of an event, concluding that people could believe in non-existent variation in 
the quality of managers' performance in the context of mutual-fund management. 
Kaivanto (2008) shows that assuming decision makers display alternation bias we can 
explain the St. Petersburg Paradox when considering conventional parameterisations of 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In another paper, 
Kaivanto and Kroll (2012) argue that the alternation bias could be an explanation for 
violations of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom. 
In this paper, we study the theoretical effect of the alternation bias on preferences over 
sums of identically distributed (not necessarily independent) monetary lotteries. For that 
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task, we use the model of the “belief in the law of small numbers” (Rabin, 2002) to 
describe the perception of sums of monetary lotteries with two or more outcomes. We 
focus on the classic example in which Paul Samuelson’s colleague (SC) was willing to 
accept 100 repetitions of a lottery while rejecting one single realization (Samuelson, 
1963). Samuelson showed that a switch in acceptance between single and repeated 
lotteries is a mistake from a normative point of view, which he called a “fallacy of large 
numbers” (SC’s fallacy hereafter). Our analysis shows that the alternation bias could 
account for SC decisions. A key point is that an alternation bias believer (ABA) will 
overestimate the perceived certainty around the average value of repeated lotteries. 
More specifically, an ABA will overestimate the probability of having five heads out of 
ten tosses. Our explanation of SC decisions is innovative because it focuses on how 
people judge probabilities rather than on properties of the utility function (see previous 
work in: Lippman and Mamer, 1988; Nielsen, 1985; Ross, 1999). Furthermore, this 
explanation is compatible with previous behavioural accounts based on loss aversion 
(Tversky and Bar-Hillel, 1983; Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Gneezy and Potters, 1997). 
Specifically, the alternation bias increases the possibility that a loss averse individual 
behaves according to SC decisions. 
In addition, we show a general result about how the alternation bias affects preferences 
on sums of lotteries. We find that a risk averse (risk seeking) individual will have a 
higher (lower) expected utility for a sum of lotteries if she is an ABA rather than a 
rational agent (RA). The result holds for the sum of     realizations of any lottery 
with     monetary outcomes. More formally, we show that the alternation bias 
reduces the perceived risk of sum of lotteries according to the definition in Rothschild 
and Stiglitz’s (1970 and 1971). The psychological intuition for this result is that 
believers in the law of small numbers perceive a reduced variability in their (repeated) 
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investments with respect to the rational case. The ultimate effect of the alternation bias 
relies on whether people like or dislike risk. To the author’s knowledge, this result has 
never been addressed in the literature. 
In the next section, we present the model of the belief in the law of small numbers. Then 
we apply the model to the perceived sum of monetary lotteries. In section 4, results 
about SC’s fallacy are presented. Section 5 contains a general result for the effect of the 
alternation bias. Finally, section 6 adds a discussion and conclusion. 
2. Belief in the law of small numbers 
Rabin (2002) describes an intuitive model to account for the well-documented 
gambler’s fallacy in the case of random variables with two outcomes.1 2 For this study, 
we extend his model to the case of multinomial random variables. The true process is 
given by a sequence of iid variables   ,          , that take values   *       + 
with probabilities   *          + . An RA has correct beliefs about the 
independence and identical distribution of each random variable. However, an ABA 
misunderstands the independence property and believes    and      (         ) are 
negatively correlated. An ABA's beliefs can be described as if each    is the i
th
 draw 
without replacement from an urn with an integer number,    , of signals. 
The number of signals representing each value     is     such that the probability 
for first draw is  (    )  
   
 
   . We will assume that the urn is renewed every 
two draws so that each odd realization is a draw from an  -signal urn independent of 
                                                          
1
 Although Rabin uses a specific intuitive description of the alternation bias, his model is mathematically 
equivalent to previous strategies (Budescu, 1987; Oskarsson et al., 2009). 
2
 In this study, we will focus on the case that the underlying distribution function of the iid random 
variables is known and the alternation bias occurs. Nonetheless, Rabin's model (2002) has interesting 
implications for situations with uncertainty about the true probability of the signals. Indeed, it has been 
experimentally shown to be consistent with prediction tasks and investment decisions (Altmann and 
Burns, 2005; Huber et al., 2010) and to be a better fit than competing theories (Asparouhova et al., 2009). 
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previous ones. Let   be an odd number, then we can generalize  (           )  
         . On the other hand, each even realization depends on the preceding draw. 
Let   be an even number then the probability of repetition is  (           )  
     
   
   , for      , and the probability of alternation is  (           )  
   
   
   ,        and    . The renewal assumption has been acknowledged by 
Rabin (2002) to be artificial but, on the other hand, coherent with   being a finite 
number (i.e. the urn will be empty after   draws if we do not impose renovation at 
some point) and convenient to improve the model tractability. For the analysis presented 
in this paper, we are aware that renewal simplifies the analysis while it captures the 
essential belief in higher alternation for an ABA than for an RA. The practical 
implication is that each pair (       ),   being even, are iid so that we can focus on the 
correlation within each pair of draws. 
Notice that the unconditional probability distribution of    is the same for all   and 
identical for an ABA and an RA (see appendix). So, the two agents believe each   ,   , 
is identically distributed but not necessarily independent. The size of the urn determines 
how much an ABA is biased. The smaller   is the higher the alternation bias is and the 
more negative the correlation between realizations is expected. Indeed, the correlation 
between an even realization and the previous odd draw can be computed as    
 
   
 
(see appendix). An RA is an individual with   being infinite so that she correctly 
expects    . In what follows, we describe conditional probabilities in terms of the 
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correlation parameter for the ease of exposition. We can model the perceived random 
process with the next transition probabilities for odd and even periods respectively:
3
 
  (           )    , for     being odd, (1) 
  (           )   
     (   
 )  , for     being even, (2) 
where     is the Kronecker delta, i.e.       if    , and       if    . Also,  
  
is the correlation coefficient between even and odd realizations for an individual with 
beliefs  , such that           . This model can account for different levels of 
alternation bias; for example the most extended finding in coin tossing that  (   )  
 (   )  
 
 
 (Oskarsson et al., 2009; Rabin, 2002; Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991; 
Budescu, 1987; Falk, 1981) by choosing the next parameters:    ;       
 
 
; 
                  
 
 
.
4 
3. Monetary lotteries 
In this section, we apply the model of the belief in the law of small numbers to 
realizations of monetary lotteries. Consider a sequence of monetary lotteries   ,   
       , that give outcome    whenever     . We are interested in studying 
preferences on the sum of these lotteries,    ∑   
 
   . 
 
3.1. Perceived sum of monetary lotteries 
                                                          
3
This model has the same transition probabilities, for even realizations, as the Multinomial Model (Wang 
and Yang, 1995) or its binomial version in Edwards (1960). Indeed Budescu (1987) used Edward's model 
for describing people's misperception of random binary sequences. 
4
 Notice that even when coin tossing is a sequence of independent random variables (   ), the bias 
generally found is a probability of alternation higher than the probability of repetition of outcomes, i.e. 
 (   )   (   )       (   )   (   )     . 
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We will define the perceived sum of lotteries as   
 
,         . An agent’s beliefs 
will affect the perceived outcome distribution of sum of lotteries as can be illustrated by 
an example. Assume a random process like coin tossing with    ;       
 
 
 and 
      . Assume also that an ABA has beliefs represented by an urn with    , such 
that       
 
 
. Imagine two lotteries    and    that give monetary outcomes    
     and         . Then the perceived sum of lotteries are 
  
   (     
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 
)  and   
    (     
 
 
       
 
 
        
 
 
) . In 
Figure 1 the aggregation of lotteries is presented. The distribution of    is the same for 
both types of agent, i.e. there is a 50/50 chance of obtaining  200/- 100. However, the 
conditional probabilities of    vary for an ABA; the probability of wining  200 is lower 
after a win in   . Notice that the expected monetary outcome is the same for   
   
 and 
  
  
 (    ), however the riskiness is lower for the former with lower probability mass 
in the extreme results ( 400 and - 200). 
3.2. Expected utility 
We will consider that decision makers are expected utility maximizers such that the 
utility of   
 
 is given by: 
   (  
 )  ∑   
  ( )            , (3) 
where   is the set of all possible monetary outcomes of   
 
. Individuals derive a 
specific utility from each monetary outcome,  ( ), that is weighted with perceived 
probabilities,   
 . Therefore, preferences depend on two distinct aspects of the decision 
process: 1) the value attached to each monetary outcome, i.e. the characteristics of the 
utility function, and; 2) the perceived distribution of outcomes given by the specific 
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beliefs (RA or ABA). This paper focuses on the role of the latter; although it turns out 
that the effect of beliefs interacts with the properties of the utility function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Perceived sum of lotteries for an RA and an ABA 
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4. SC’s fallacy 
Samuelson (1963) discussed the (lack of) rationality of his colleague by showing that a 
sequence of independent ventures of a lottery will not have a favourable expected utility 
if one single instance of the lottery is worse than abstention at each possible level of 
wealth given by that sequence. Formally:
5
 
Samuelson theorem. An expected utility maximiser should reject to play n independent 
repetitions of a lottery l if the next assumption holds: 
A1. Given the minimum and maximum wealth obtainable after playing n repetitions of 
lottery  ,      and      respectively, we have that 
   ( )    (   )    ,         -. (4) 
This theoretical result is striking given the evidence that people are willing to accept 
repeated lotteries and, at the same time, reject a single realization of those (Liu and 
Colman, 2009; DeKay and Kim, 2005; Redelmeier and Tversky, 1992; Montgomery 
and Adelbratt, 1982). Even more, SC decisions could be considered sensible given the 
riskiness of the lottery offered by Samuelson and the sound investment opportunity of 
100 realizations (Lopes, 1981 and 1996; Benartzi and Thaler, 1999). 
Previous accounts of this type of behaviour have been based on relaxing assumption 
A1, either within normative theory (Lippman and Mamer, 1988; Nielsen, 1985; Ross, 
1999) or from behavioural economics (Tversky and Bar-Hillel, 1983; Benartzi and 
Thaler, 1995; Gneezy and Potters, 1997). Both approaches point to the way individuals 
assess monetary outcomes. For example, Ross (1999) established sufficient conditions 
for the utility function that lead to the acceptance of lotteries when these are repeated a 
                                                          
5
 A formal proof of the theorem can be found in Samuelson (1963) or Ross (1999). 
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sufficient number of times. On the other hand, the behavioural economics literature has 
focused on loss aversion as the psychological factor behind SC decisions. People are 
reluctant to take lotteries with a large probability of losses; 50% in the case of 
Samuelson lottery. However, when this lottery is played several times the probability of 
losses is reduced – e.g. the probability of a loss drops to 25% when it is played twice - 
and people are more willing to take the risk. 
In this section, we show that even if A1 holds we can explain SC behaviour if she 
believes in the law of small numbers. Therefore, we depart from previous account in 
that we focus on the way individuals perceive probabilities rather than on how they 
value monetary outcomes. Furthermore, we show that alternation bias and loss aversion 
are two mutually compatible explanations of SC decisions. 
4.1. Alternation bias as an explanation 
Samuelson called a fallacy the belief that it is almost a sure thing that there will be a 
million heads when two million symmetric coins are tossed. This fallacy makes people 
feel that adding risks will improve the certainty of a result. On the contrary, the sum of 
independent lotteries will increase the actual range of possible outcomes. A similar 
fallacy will appear if a person is a believer in the law of small numbers. An ABA will 
overestimate the probability of having five heads out of ten tosses, therefore increasing 
the perceived certainty around the average value. An ABA will be biased even for short 
sequences of a bet and will not necessarily need one hundred tosses to have 
misperception of risk. 
The alternation bias affects one key assumption of Samuelson theorem: lotteries are 
independent. As shown next, Samuelson theorem does not hold if we consider that 
people are ABAs with a misunderstanding of the independence property. An ABA will 
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perceive one single realization of Samuelson lottery with no bias 
  
    (     
 
 
        
 
 
). Consider now that the individual has a constant absolute 
risk aversion (CARA) utility function  ( )         satisfying A1. Notice that we 
can assume wealth level to be zero without loss of generality. Then by numerical 
solution we have that   
   
 will be rejected when the parameter of absolute risk 
aversion is higher than 0.00481: 
    (  
   )  
 
 
 (   )  
 
 
 (    )                         (5) 
Assume now that the same individual with           is offered two realizations. 
Following equations (1) and (2), the perceived outcome distribution is   
    
(     
      
 
       
      
 
        
      
 
). Then, we can show that acceptance is 
guaranteed for a sufficiently large alternation bias. Acceptance occurs whenever the 
next expression holds: 
   (  
   )  
      
 
 (   )  
      
 
 (   )  
      
 
 (    )   . (6) 
Rearranging we obtain: 
  (  
   )  
    [
 
 
 (   )  
 
 
 (   )  
 
 
 (    )⏟                    
                    ( )
]   
 
 
 (   )  
 
 
 (   )  
 
 
 (    )⏟                    
   (  
  )                          
    (7) 
Given that      ,    ), the expected utility of the two repetitions is a linear function 
of      with its maximum at   (  
   )   (   )    whenever         and 
lower limit at   (  
   )    (  
  )    when      approaches rationality of zero 
correlation, i.e. when the independence property is correctly perceived. Notice that 
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  (  
  )    because Samuelson theorem holds for rational individuals. The 
implication is that the alternation bias, if sufficiently large, could result in decisions 
consistent with SC’s fallacy. 6 
4.2. Alternation bias and loss aversion working together 
The analysis above shows that loss aversion is not the only behavioural explanation of 
SC decisions. Furthermore, the alternation bias works together with loss aversion by 
increasing the range of loss averse individuals that will behave as SC. Loss aversion 
explains SC behaviour because the likelihood of losses drops as the lottery is repeated. 
However, if loss aversion is too high a patient could reject both single and multiple 
realizations. The alternation bias makes the probability of losses to decrease faster when 
lotteries are repeated. Therefore, alternation bias makes SC behaviour to be plausible 
even if loss aversion is too high. 
Consider an RA with the next utility function 
  ( )  {
           
            
       , (8) 
where   is defined as variation of wealth and   is the loss aversion parameter. It is easy 
to show that for   (   ) this subject will reject one single realization of Samuelson 
lottery and accept two repetitions of it in accordance with SC’s fallacy. 
                                                          
6
 Notice that given the renewal assumption of the model any pair of adjacent lotteries are perceived as 
independent. Hence, applying the same logic from Samuelson theorem, acceptance of two realizations of 
Samuelson lottery,   (  
   )   , is sufficient for the acceptance of any number r of repetitions of the 
two realizations, i.e.   (   
   )   . 
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Consider now an ABA with the same utility function in (8). She will reject the single 
lottery for     as in the RA case. However, she will accept two repetitions of the 
lottery when the expected utility is positive: 
   (  
   )  
      
 
(   )  
      
 
(   )  
      
 
(     )   , (9) 
which leads to the next equivalent condition 
   
      
      
  . (10) 
Condition (10) implies that for   (  
      
      
  ) an ABA will behave according to 
SC’s fallacy. Given        this interval is wider than the one for an RA. The 
interpretation is that the alternation bias makes SC behaviour plausible for a wider range 
of loss averse individuals. Moreover, when the alternation bias approaches perfect 
negative correlation,        , the upper bound of the interval tends to infinity 
meaning that the individual will accept two realizations of the single lottery no matter 
how large the degree of loss aversion is. 
5. A general result 
Given   
   
 and   
  
, we want to show the next proposition based on Rothschild and 
Stiglitz’s (1970 and 1971) definition of increasing risk: 
Proposition. There exists a lottery  with  [ |  
     ]   ,     , such that 
   
   
 
  
     , (11) 
where "  
 
" has to be interpreted as "has the same distribution as". 
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Expression (11) implies that the perceived sum for an ABA is less risky than the one for 
an RA. Therefore, we will show that   
   
 second-order stochastically dominates   
  
. 
Notice that for this result to apply we need          but we do not need      , 
i.e. the actual lotteries are not necessarily independent. We first show the case of     
and then generalize the result to    . 
5.1. The case of     
Consider the case of two successive lotteries *     +  with     possible outcomes 
*       + with unconditional probabilities *       +. Let us call   
    
    
 
 the 
lottery formed by the sum of these lotteries when beliefs are   ,         . 
Proposition (   ): 
   
   
 
  
     , (12) 
where  [ |  
     ]        . 
Proof. See appendix for full details. 
The proof of the proposition is based on showing that the probability distribution of   
after the realization of   
       and   
       is: 
         
{
 
 
 
  (   )  
(     )
(      )
 (       )  
(        )
 (      )
 (       )  
(        )
 (      )
                     (   )   . (13) 
The intuitive reasoning for finding   relies on the fact that   
   
 has more probability 
mass than   
  
 for monetary quantities derived from alternation of outcomes. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
17 
 
Therefore, summing   to   
   
 must reduce the probability of outcomes given by 
alternation (i.e. when      ) while increases the probability of monetary quantities 
derived from repetition (i.e. when      ). Notice, that this is what we do by defining 
  in (13). Even more, it is easy to see that  [ |  
     ]         because its 
conditional distribution, after alternation or repetition, is symmetrical around zero. 
5.2. The case of     
Consider the case of   successive lotteries *       +  with     possible outcomes 
*       + with unconditional probabilities *       +. Let us call   
    
    
  
 
 the aggregate lottery formed by the sum of these lotteries when belief is   , 
        . 
Proposition (   ): 
   
   
 
  
     . (14) 
where  [ |  
     ]        . 
Proof. Consider the sum of lotteries for an ABA: 
   
      
      
      
      
          
      
   
. (15) 
Notice that given transition probabilities in (1) and (2) the sum of each pair of lotteries 
    
      
   
,   being an even number, is independent of the remaining lotteries and 
identically distributed to   
      
      
   
. Assume   is an even number, then 
using Proposition (n=2) in (12) we will have:
7
 
                                                          
7
 The extension of the result when   is an odd number is straightforward. 
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      (  
     )  (  
     )    (  
     )⏟                    
         
 
 
 
 
 
  
     
       
  
⏟         
         
 ⏟
      ( )     ( )
  
  
, (16) 
where         ⏟    
         
 and   has the same probability distribution as in (13).8  
6. Discussion and conclusion 
Incorporation of a well-studied cognitive bias to the standard economic model allowed 
us to make specific predictions about preferences for repeated investments. We have 
formally stated the intuitive result that a believer in the law of small numbers perceives 
repeated monetary lotteries as less risky. Given that the alternation bias only affects 
perception of lotteries if multiple plays are considered we can explain inconsistencies 
between single and multiple-play lotteries implied by SC’s fallacy (1963). Moreover, 
our behavioural account is innovative because it relies on the psychological mechanism 
of perception of probabilities rather than on the evaluation of monetary outcomes 
(Tversky and Bar-Hillel, 1983; Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Gneezy and Potters, 1997). 
Alternation bias is sufficient for explaining SC decisions with no need for rejecting 
other behavioural conditions (Lippman and Mamer, 1988; Nielsen, 1985; Ross, 1999) 
that could be considered as reasonable (Lopes, 1996; Benartzi and Thaler, 1999). 
Our general result that the effect of the alternation bias interacts with the shape of the 
utility function offers new opportunities for empirical research. Any empirical evidence 
could be interpreted in terms of the theoretical findings. For example, a positive 
(negative) relationship between alternation bias and preferences for repeated lotteries 
could be interpreted as evidence for concavity (convexity) of the utility function. 
                                                          
8
 Notice that each lottery   is different and conditional on each adjacent   
   . Also notice that given 
 [ |  
     ]   ,    , we will also have  [ |  
     ]   ,    . 
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Nonetheless, an empirical test of the theoretical results should consider measurement of 
preferences, alternation bias and the utility function. Future work could contribute to the 
existing literature testing theoretical predictions and economic consequences of the 
belief in the law of small numbers (Altmann and Burns, 2005; Huber et al., 2010; 
Croson and Sundali, 2005; Asparouhova et al., 2009). 
Previous work on randomness perception showed that individuals could have varying 
levels of alternation bias (Budescu, 1987; Rapoport and Budescu, 1992; Ayton and 
Fischer, 2004). For example, in Budescu's experiment 1 subjects were classified 
according to whether they showed overall negative or positive recency, according to 
whether they produced more or less alternation than expected for an independent 
random process. Most of them showed beliefs consistent with the alternation bias (13 
out of 18 subjects), however some individuals presented a positive recency or no 
systematic bias at all.
9
 We should expect that the higher the alternation bias is the higher 
the effect on choices for repeated lotteries will be. Even more, in the case of the so 
called "positive recency" bias, which implies that         , the theoretical results 
are straightforward and opposite to the case of          assumed in this paper. 
Those with "positive recency" should be less (more) willing to play sum of lotteries than 
RAs if they are risk averse (seekers). 
A relevant question is whether the analysis here exposed can be applied to lotteries that 
are played in parallel rather than sequentially. Several factors can be considered here on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds. The presented model can be valid if the 
perception of the aggregated parallel lotteries is correctly predicted. In this sense, we 
                                                          
9
 Comparable results are found in Rapoport and Budescu (1992). Ayton and Fischer (2004) found 
evidence that the same subjects could believe in positive or negative recency for distinct types of random 
process. In their experiments individuals showed negative recency in their expectations for the outcome 
of a roulette game and, simultaneously, positive recency in expectations for their success and failures of 
their predictions for the outcomes of the same game. 
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should wonder whether parallel lotteries exist in practice. If two subjects agreed to toss 
two coins at the same time point some elapsed time between the two tosses is expected 
(at least few milliseconds). Therefore, an individual could interpret parallel lotteries as a 
special sequence of lotteries played quickly one after another. In any case, the 
applicability of the model to parallel lotteries relies on an empirical question: How do 
people perceive simultaneously played lotteries? Imagine that people perceived two 
parallel lotteries as if they were two simultaneous draws from an urn in such a way that 
the two drawn signals must be different. In this case the two draws are negatively 
correlated as if they were sequential draws without replacement; i.e. as our model 
predicts. 
Furthermore, the belief in the “law of small numbers” asserts that the law of large 
numbers applies to small samples as well, so that people expect small samples to be 
highly representative of the population from which they are drawn. For example, 
researchers are overconfident about findings derived from small samples (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1971) and their estimations of sampling distribution or posterior 
probabilities are independent of sample size (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972). In 
principle, this belief is applied to any sample formed by either sequential or 
simultaneous draws. However, evidence on perception of randomness has been mainly 
focused on sequences. Some empirical work, close to the parallel case, is found in tasks 
of judgment of the distribution of two colours among cells of two-dimensional grids. 
Notice that whether the distribution is the result of a sequence or parallel realizations is 
not a relevant factor. Interestingly, a grid is judged most random when alternation rate is 
about 0.6, i.e. when the colour changes in 60% of the horizontal and vertical transitions 
(Zhao et al., 2014; Falk and Konold, 1997). 
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Some extensions of the present analysis could be considered for its applicability to 
actual data. For example, the model of “beliefs in the law of small numbers” (Rabin, 
2002) limits the effect of the alternation bias to adjacent realizations of lotteries given 
the renewal assumption. Applications of this model to actual decisions should consider 
relaxation of this assumption to extend the alternation bias effect to subsequent 
realizations; for example, people believe that chances for head are higher after three 
consecutive tosses resulting in tails than after only one toss resulting in tails (see Rabin, 
2002, or Rapoport and Budescu, 1997). Another possible path to continue this work is 
by considering other theories of decision under risk like Rank Dependent Utility (RDU, 
Quiggin, 1981) or Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
Different results could be found under these theories because the effect of the 
alternation bias on preferences for repeated lotteries would not only depend on the 
shape of the utility function (concave or convex) but also on the properties of the 
probability weighting function like overweighting of small probabilities, 
underweighting of large probabilities, or upper and lower subadditivity (see Tversky 
and Wakker, 1995, or Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). 
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Appendix 
Unconditional probabilities 
For an RA it is obvious that  (    )    ,        . The same applies to odd 
realizations for ABAs. 
For ABAs and   being even, we have: 
  (    )   , (           )-  ∑     (           )
 
    
   
     
   ⏟   
           
 ∑    
   
      ⏟    
            
    
   
   
 
  
   
 (    )  
   
   
  
  
   
 
 
   
   
 
  (   )
   
   ,     . (A1) 
Correlation between realizations 
The correlation coefficient between even realization   and the previous one     can be 
computed as: 
      (       )  
   (      )
√   (  )   (    )
 
   (      )
   (  )
 
 ,      -  ,  -
 
 [  
 ]  ,  -
 . (A2) 
Before continuing, the following expressions make the algebra easier: 
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Now combining (A2) and (A5) 
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Proof of Proposition (   ) 
   
   
 
  
     , (A7) 
where E[ |  
     ]        . 
Proof. Specifically, we will prove that   is obtained with the next procedure: 
Generation of  . Given the realization of   
       and   
       we will add 
lottery   with the next distribution: 
         
{
 
 
 
  (   )  
(     )
(      )
 (       )  
(        )
 (      )
 (       )  
(        )
 (      )
                     (   )   . (A8) 
It can be easily seen that  [ |  
     ]   ,     . Hence, it will be shown that 
  
      has the same distribution as   
  
. 
Let us first define the set of all combinations of non-equal monetary outcomes (     ) 
such that their sum is  , i.e.   {(   )            }  Also we will define the 
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outcome whose repetition sums up  ,   *       +. Notice that R is a singleton. 
This way we can represent the probability of  ,  (  
   ), by adding the probability 
of all elements in   and  . Given transition probabilities in expression (1) and (2) the 
outcome distribution of   
 
 is determined by: 
 (  
   )  ∑  (  
       
    )(   )    (  
       
    )  
∑ [   {(   
 )  }](   )      , 
  (    )  -. (A9) 
We can follow a similar procedure to obtain  (  
       ). In this case   could be 
the outcome of   
      due to four mutually exclusive events: 
a)   
    ,   
     and    , for (   )   ; 
b)   
    ,   
     and    ; 
c)   
    ,   
     and        , for    ; 
d)   
    ,   
     and        , for    . 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
25 
 
So that we can compute the probability of   as the summation of the probabilities for 
events a) to d):  
 (  
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∑ [ (  
         
      )   (      
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 (A10) 
We can divide expression (A10) in two parts: 
1) ∑ [   {(   
   )  }  
(     )
(      )
](   )   ∑ [   {(   
  )  }](   )  . 
2)    , 
    (      )  -  ∑ [   {(   
   )  }  
(        )
 (      )
]    
∑ [   *(   
   )  +  
(        )
 (      )
]       , 
    (      )  -  
∑ [      
(        )
 
]    ∑ [      
(        )
 
]       
,     (      )  -  ∑ [      ( 
       )]       
,     (      )  -     (    )  ( 
       )     
,    (     )  -. 
Now we combine the two parts, 
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  (  
       )  ∑ [   [(   
  )  ]](   )      , 
   (     )  -  
 (  
    ),  (A11) 
therefore, according to expression (A11) the probability of outcome   is the same for  
  
      and   
  
, so they have the same distribution.  
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